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Abstract

When pressed for evidence that the proposed health reform legislation will control costs,
proponents invariably cite the numerous pilot programs and other innovations in Medicare
payment policy contained in the bill. At first blush, the ACO model seems well designed to foster
competition among providers. Not unlike health maintenance organizations and other integrated
delivery forms, ACOs assume responsibility for coordinating care and thus have strong
incentives to provide cost effective care and to do so in a manner that is transparent and
hospitable to comparative shoppers. But at the same time, the path of ACO development could
prove profoundly anti-competitive. The concern lies with the possible exacerbation of alreadyweak competitive conditions prevailing in provider markets. This essay, written at as the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act was enacted, discusses competition policy issues associated
with the Shared Savings Program.
When pressed for evidence that the proposed health reform legislation will control costs,
proponents invariably cite the numerous pilot programs and other innovations in Medicare
payment policy contained in the bill. Among the most promising of these is the “Shared Savings
Program” found in Section 3022 of H.R. 3590, 1 which will test the effectiveness of Accountable
Care Organizations (ACOs) in rationalizing the delivery system and controlling costs. The idea,
which carries the endorsement of the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) 2 and
the influential health service researchers at Dartmouth, 3 is not entirely novel. In many respects
the ACO is the latest in a long line of efforts to develop integrated delivery systems that bear
financial responsibility for treatment decisions. In addition, a number of experiments involving
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bundled payments to ACOs and to other innovative organizations (as in Medicare’s Physician
Group Practice demonstration) have been underway for some time.
Supporters contend that as a voluntary pilot program, ACOs can develop in forms
suitable to local market conditions and gain acceptance in the physician communities that have
proved resistant to managed care structures in the past. In the long run, the aspiration is that
private insurers will follow suit and proliferating ACOs will lead the way to delivery system
reform.
The ACO concept envisions a legal entity comprised of and controlled by providers that
would assume financial responsibility for the cost and care of a defined population of Medicare
beneficiaries while being subject to a variety of quality standards and information reporting
requirements. 4 The new law leaves much detail to the discretion of the Secretary of the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), 5 presumably informed by experience and
learning as the program progresses. For example, the legislation delegates development of
standards for quality, use of evidence-based medicine, and “patient-centeredness” to HHS. 6 In
addition, ACOs may take diverse forms, such as local networks of physicians, hospitals, and
their affiliated physicians, fully integrated health systems, or “virtual” networks of providers. 7
Notably, the new law allows the Secretary of HHS to implement several alternative incentive
payment methodologies including a “shared savings” performance bonus arrangements based on
the ACOs net savings from traditional Medicare payment ; “partial captitation” of some or all of
Part A and B costs; and such other methodologies that the Secretary determines will improve
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quality and efficiency). Each option poses raises significant questions. For example it is not clear
that a shared savings bonus model will effectively counteract the volume-increasing incentives
under fee-for-service payment; nor is it clear that partial capitation payment can be implemented
without raising issues of under-provision of care and other problems associated with managed
care in the past. 8
A critical problem, largely ignored during the legislative debate, is the likely tension
between the legislation’s overall reliance on competition and the organizational structures and
norms that may be established by ACOs. At first blush, the ACO model seems well designed to
foster competition among providers. Not unlike health maintenance organizations and other
integrated delivery forms, ACOs assume responsibility for coordinating care and thus have
strong incentives to provide cost effective care and to do so in a manner that is transparent and
hospitable to comparative shoppers.
But at the same time, the path of ACO development could prove profoundly anticompetitive. The concern lies with the possible exacerbation of already-weak competitive
conditions prevailing in provider markets. Owing to indifferent enforcement of antitrust laws by
the Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice over the last ten years and
questionable judicial precedents, hospital mergers proceeded at an unprecedented pace. 9 Over
ninety-three percent of the nation’s population lived in concentrated hospital markets, and the
American consumer bore the brunt of the predictable outcome: hospital consolidation in the
1990s raised overall inpatient prices by at least five percent and by forty percent or more when
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merging hospitals were closely located. 10 Less well noted is the concentration in specialty
physician markets that went unchallenged during recent years, lessening the ability of managed
care organizations to negotiate lower prices for their services. 11 Further, even where antitrust
prosecutors were active, challenging over seventy-five physician cartels involved in price fixing
or efforts to thwart managed care, the relief gained was little more than a wrist slap, an
unfortunate dereliction that certainly did little to foster competitive norms in the provider
community. 12 Overall, it is fair to characterize the prevailing attitude among providers over the
past thirty years as one of seeking first to avoid competition though concentrative mergers and
other affiliations and, in some cases, by engaging in illegal collusion.
Encouraging competitive development of ACOs in this market environment may prove
challenging. First, it is unclear the extent to which regulators will foster the formation of
multiple, competitive ACOs around the country. It is certainly feasible that HHS might
determine (as the reform legislation appears to allow) that it is more important to encourage
voluntary participation in ACOs than to promote competitive ACOs. An “open door” policy for
ACOs (allowing them to include all comers in their markets) would likely lead to concentrated
formal and informal affiliations. (As noted above, the FTC has dealt with dozens of proposed
physician networks and “super PHOs” of considerable size that proposed to bargain on behalf of
physicians and hospitals; efforts to create overinclusive ACOs to lessen rivalry are unlikely to
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diminish). It also bears remembering that provider groups have lobbied incessantly for many
years for exemptions from antitrust laws, arguing at various times that a “level playing field”
justified collective bargaining by physicians, or that efficiency would be improved by such
immunity. 13
Even if the Secretary adopts a policy of encouraging competition among ACOs, there
may be competitive obstacles to effectively implementing that goal. First, as discussed above,
the highly concentrated state of many provider markets may make it difficult for HHS to secure
participants willing to “share” their savings proportionately with other providers. Moreover, if
the Medicare ACOs are seen as likely to be adopted by private insurers, dominant providers will
not be reticent to exercise their market clout. As Robert Leibenluft, a former FTC official has
pointed out, in allocating among themselves the shared savings of their ACO, physicians and
hospitals may adversely affect competition in the private market:
The meetings at which the reallocation of those funds occurs may . . . be the types
of meetings in which price collusion can take place. Deciding how ACO
revenues should be divided among the ACO participants typically would not raise
antitrust concerns, but serious issues would arise if such discussions spill over
into how independent providers will contract outside the ACO context.
The new arrangements also may make it easier for physicians to exclude
potential competitors from entry into the local market. 14
As I have argued elsewhere, 15 the structure of our health care delivery system gives us
the worst of both worlds: fragmentation and concentration. Hospital and specialty provider
markets are highly concentrated; most primary care physicians remain in “silos” of solo or small
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practice groups; and there is scant “vertical integration” among providers of different services.
Not only does this phenomenon impede effective bargaining to reduce costs and prevent
overutilization of services, but it also has adverse effects on the quality of health services patients
receive because it inhibits coordination of care. While ACOs represent the most promising
antidote on the horizon to this problem, their success will depend on vigilant monitoring of
competitive conditions by HHS and the antitrust enforcement authorities.

